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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 87
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct.App. 1988) and 1988 W.L. 79881 (Utah App.)
[West Law].
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
a.

The decision to be reviewed was entered on July 26, 1988.

b.

No order respecting rehearing or granting an extension of
time to petition for certiorari has been entered.

c.

Rule 44(c) is inapplicable.

d.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over judgments of the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3):
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(a)

a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW

a.

United States Constitution
Article VI § 3: . . . but no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office of public Trust under the United States.
Amendment I: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; . . . .

b.

Constitution of Utah
Article I § 4: The rights of conscience shall
never be infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious
test shall be required as a qualification for
any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompe-
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tent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. . . .
c.

Statute
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3: Discrimination prohibited. A citizen shall not be excluded or
exempt from jury service on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status.

-4-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature and Proceedings.

Plaintiff sued the owner

and two farmers for personal injuries incurred when he dropped
his motorcycle to avoid hitting a cow which had strayed onto a
roadway.

Judgment for the defendants was granted upon a jury

verdict.

Plaintiff appealed, alleging inter alia, that the ques-

tioning of potential jurors had been improperly limited.

The

Court of Appeals (Bench, Billings, Jackson, JJ.), reversed and
ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court's refusal to
question the jurors as to their membership in a defendant religious entity improperly curtailed the plaintiff's ability to
exercise his peremptory challenges wisely even though the questions to the jury were adequate in preventing bias or prejudice.
Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 87 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23 (1988)["Hornsby"]; App. a.
2.

Statement of Facts.

Petitioner Corporation of

the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (the "CPB") is a religious corporation sole which holds
title to a number of Mormon or L.D.S. Church properties, including a farm in Salt Lake County which is part of its welfare program (the "Farm").

Petitioner Giblett managed the Farm. (R. 650,

631; Hornsby at 23; App. a.)
On March 30, 1983, Giblett and defendant Sutton, owner
of adjacent farmland, attempted to move two cows that had escaped
from the Farm to one of Sutton's pastures.

-5-

Sutton backed a horse

trailer to the gate of his pasture, opened the gate to the trailer and fastened the gate to its side with baling wire and a
hook.

The two men then herded the two cows toward the trailer.

One cow entered the trailer, but the other plunged against the
gate, and the baling wire gave way.

The cow escaped.

(R. 629,

630, 650, 673, 662, 691, 598, 658, 660, 662, 663; Hornsby at 23;
App. a.)
Giblett and Sutton pursued the runaway with the help of
two boys and Sutton's daughter Mary.

Mary drove her car up and

down the area with flashing lights then pulled to the roadside to
search on foot.
car.

After spotting the runaway, she returned to her

She saw the plaintiff Hornsby approaching on his motorcycle

and waved her arms to warn him.

(R. 643, 938, 775, 561, 584,

777, 792, 780, 782, 799, 797, 793; Hornsby at 23; App. a.)
Plaintiff admitted seeing Mary wave but said he thought
she was merely greeting him.

After he had passed her and the

car, he saw the cow come into the road and dropped his motorcycle, sustaining injuries in the process.

He sued, alleging a

variety of claims in negligence. (R. 647, 923, 924, 798, 579;
Hornsby at 23; App. a.)
3.

Voir Dire.

At trial, the court asked potential

jurors:
. . . Ladies and Gentlemen, there's a couple
of other questions I want to ask you. As
you're all aware, one of the Defendants in
this case is the Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and it's none of this Court's
business, or anybody's business what your
-6-

religious preferences are. And I intend to
ask no questions in that regard. But this is
a civil matter; it's not a religious matter.
It doesn't have anything to do with anybody's
theories, or ideas, or beliefs with regard to
religion. But I want to make sure there is
no one on the jury who feels that they would
have difficulty serving as a juror because of
any strong feelings they may have one way or
another with regard to the LDS Church. So
let me ask the question this way: Are there
any of you who feel that you would have trouble being an impartial juror because of feelings you may have either pro or con with
regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think
might affect your ability to be a fair and
impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd
like you to raise your hand.
The record will show that all members of the
jury have indicated that that would have no
effect on their decision one way or the other. All parties, Ladies and Gentlemen, regardless of whether they are a religion, or a
business, or what position an individual may
hold in the community, are entitled to equal
justice under our system of law. And it's
very important that all members -- parties
receive a fair and impartial evaluation of
their rights and responsibilities, and their
conduct by a jury regardless of their station
in the community. You've all indicated that
you would do that.
Couple other general questions, Ladies and
Gentlemen. These are only questions that you
can answer by looking at your own state of
mind, and your own thoughts regarding things,
because we can't look into your mind. But
let me ask you this: Is there any reason
that we have not yet discussed -- if we've
already talked about it, obviously we don't
need to go over it again -- is there any
reason we have not yet discussed that you
think might affect your ability to be a fair
and impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd
like you to raise your hand. The record will
show that none of the prospective panel have
so indicated. Let me ask the same question
another way. Ladies and Gentlemen, if I can,
if you were a party to this suit, if you were
-7-

the Plaintiff, Mr. Hornsby, or if you were
the Defendant, the LDS Church, or Mr. Giblett
or Mr. and Mrs. Sutton -- Mr. and Mrs.
Sutton, if you were a party to this lawsuit,
and knowing your own state of mind as potential jurors in this case, are there any of
you who would be dissatisfied, or feel uncomfortable having a juror of your like thinking
at the present time sitting in judgment of
your case? In other words, would you be
satisfied if all eight jurors that were going
to decide your case had the same frame of
mind about things, and the same willingness,
or lack thereof, to follow the law on the
facts, and decide your case. If so, I'd like
you to raise your hand if you would have
difficulty with a juror like yourself on your
own jury if you were here as a party.
(R. 1023-25; see Hornsby at 23; App. a.)
The trial court refused to question the potential jurors as to their religious affiliation, their residence in the
religious unit (stake) in which the Farm was located or whether
any of them held office in the Mormon Church.

(R. 325-28;

Hornsby at 23-24; App. a.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE.
Petitioners submit that this is an important case of

first impression.

Although some courts have considered the pro-

priety of asking jurors questions about their religious affiliation, research indicates no case in which a court has either held
or been asked to hold that a juror's religious affiliation must
be divulged in order to permit a litigant to exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of a juror's religion when the juror's
religion does not constitute grounds for challenge for cause.
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Petitioners submit that this novel question is of substantial importance, particularly in a state in which many citizens belong to a religion and many other citizens oppose that
religion strongly.

Petitioners submit that to permit courts to

inquire into the religious affiliation or the absence of a religious affiliation of jurors when religious doctrine is not at
issue violates constitutional and legal principles, exalting the
peremptory challenge (which is governed only by rule) above constitutional principle and the rights of privacy of individual
jurors.
Petitioners further submit that the Court of Appeals
decision, which would require such inquiry for the sole purpose
of facilitating peremptory challenges, will create improper prejudice and stigma against religion and particular religions and
will create obstacles in the selection of juries.

If one party

is permitted to argue that religious affiliation should be divulged as a basis for its peremptory challenges, then the other
should have the same right to inquire whether there are jury
panel members who are affiliated with other religions which oppose the first religion or who have no religion and have views
which oppose religion, either specific religions or religion in
general.

This line of questioning would lead to inquiry into

doctrine and belief, improperly entangling courts into religious
freedom and conscience.
This Court should consider such an important issue and
should reverse the order of the Court of Appeals.
-9-

II.

NO COURT HAS REQUIRED THE DISCLOSURE OF RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION AS A QUALIFICATION FOR JURY SERVICE.
The leading case considering the proper questioning of

potential jurors when a religious entity is involved is Casey v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d
627, 72 A.L.R.2d 893 (1958) (Appendix c ) . While attending religious services, Harriet Casey had fallen on a slippery waxed
floor at a Catholic Church, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, a religious corporation sole.

She sued for

injuries, including permanent damages resulting from broken
wrists.
During voir dire, Miss Casey's counsel asked the trial
court to explain that the defendant was a corporation sole and
owner and in possession of the church building.

Plaintiff also

asked that each member of the panel be asked:
Does any member of the jury panel have any
preconceived objections to, or any preconceived opinions in favor of, or any bias or
prejudice in favor of or against, a suit in
which Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore,
a corporation sole of the State of Maryland,
is sought to be held liable in damages for
injuries claimed to have resulted to a person, a member of the Parish of the Roman
Catholic Church in which such persons claims
have been injured, that would prevent you
from fairly and impartially deciding such a
case?
If, in your opinion, the evidence in the case
warrants a verdict for the plaintiff, Miss
Casey, against Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore, a corporation sole of the State of
Maryland, the defendant, is there any member
of the jury panel who could not fairly and
impartially assess damages in the case in the
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same manner as if the defendant were a regular corporation or a natural person?
The Court declined to ask those questions but did advise the jurors that one of the parties was a religious corporation, and asked:
Is there any reason, such as religious scruples or any other reason, which would prevent
any one of you from giving the parties a fair
and impartial trial, finding a verdict based
only on the law and the evidence?
None of the panel members indicated any bias or prejudice.

Judg-

ment was eventually granted to the plaintiff, but in an amount
she contended was inadequate because of juror reluctance to make
an award against a religion.
In reversing the trial court, the Maryland Supreme
Court found that the trial court's single question whether religious scruples or anything else would bias a juror was insufficient to determine a possible cause of disqualification by reason
of bias or prejudice.

The question was so general that it did

not give adequate indication whether bias or prejudice was in
fact being probed.
Rather, the jurors should have been informed that the
suit was against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, a
corporation sole and a religious entity, for personal injuries
allegedly incurred by Miss Casey in her fall at the church.

Then

the court should have asked whether there was any reason why a
juror could not arrive at a fair and impartial verdict according
to the instructions of the court.
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The question to be asked and

the answers would disclose cause for disqualification but "would
not necessarily have revealed the religious affiliation of the
juror who made answer, and whether the juror was favorably or
unfavorably disposed toward the Roman Catholic Church or toward
an adherent of its religious faith."

217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627,

72 A.L.R.2d at 901.
Casey thus states the principle that an inquiry into
whether a potential juror had prejudice either for or against a
particular religion or religious entity is valid and that prejudice should be determined.

However, the question to be presented

to determine the existence of any prejudice was such that no
juror needed to disclose personal religious views in responding.
The Maryland court thus sought to protect against prejudice but
not to intrude into any jury panel member's beliefs or otherwise
disclose a potential juror's religion.

The Maryland court went

no further; it did not examine the question of peremptory challenges.
Petitioners contend that the Casey statement is adequate for protecting a fair trial and that its principles were
clearly followed, as the Appellate Court agreed, by the trial
court in this case.

See the trial court's questions at pp. 6-8,

supra.
Petitioners submit that to require that trial courts
question further and that potential jurors divulge their religious views simply so that a party may assume a religious prejudice which is not sufficient to challenge for cause constitutes
-12-

an unreasonable burden upon jurors and the jury system, an issue
which justifies review by this Court.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING JURY
SELECTION MAKE RELIGIOUS QUESTIONING FOR PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE PURPOSES IMPROPER.
Article I § 4 of the Constitution of Utah provides, in
part:
The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust . . .;
nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief
or the absence thereof. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
The Constitution of the United States contains similar language:
. . . but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office of
public Trust under the United States.
U.S. Const., Art. VI § 3.
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; . . . .
U.S. Const., Amendment I.
These principles are codified in the Judicial Code,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3:
Discrimination prohibited.
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt
from jury service on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin or economic
status. (Emphasis added.)
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These clear and unequivocal statements prevent both a
religious test for service as a juror and any form of discrimination by any governmental agency against persons on account of
religious preference or the absence of religious preference.
These principles are respected when, during voir dire,
questions like those in Casey and that of the trial court are
asked to permit challenges against jurors when any potentially
prejudicial belief, including religious preference, might cause
the juror to be unable to render a fair verdict on the facts and
instructions of law to be heard at trial.

The question whether a

juror has any views, either favorable or unfavorable, solves the
problem of bias and prejudice while protecting religious conscience and free exercise of religion.

This balance has been

struck over the years in order to preserve the religious free
exercise of the individual juror and to prevent any prejudice
against a particular litigant in a criminal or civil case.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals changes the balance.

It requires courts to use their power in cases in which a

religion is involved to compel jurors to disclose religious views
so that peremptory challenges can be used systematically to discriminate against jurors of a particular religious persuasion.
The Court of Appeals, contrary to constitutional provisions that
no juror can be kept from service if otherwise qualified because
of the presence or absence of religious belief, will open the
question of religion and membership in a particular denomination
to public scrutiny and as a test of office.
-14-

This should be pro-

hibited.

No case that Petitioners have been able to locate has

ever gone so far.

The Casey court did not.

This Court has not,

either.
In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), defense
counsel should have been permitted to ask a prospective juror in
a drunk driving case whether his abstention from drinking alcoholic beverages was based on religious principles.

The defendant

had exhausted his peremptory challenges, and the failure to permit the inquiry was held prejudicial error.
In State v. Kay, 475 P.2d 541 (Utah 1970), the Mormon
Church was the victim of the alleged wrongdoing.

The defense

attorney sought to disqualify all potential jurors who were members of the religion, arguing that "The unfairness of a Mormon
sitting in judgment of one charged with wrongdoing concerning his
church and his own property seems patently clear."

This Court

rejected the sweeping indictment of a large class of citizens.
It said:
This quoted language appears to be an indictment of every Mormon that is so unspecified
and sweeping as to amount to what we consider
to be an ecclesiastical non sequitur. It is
an ipse dixit that imputes to every Mormon,
or for that matter, every Catholic, every
Protestant, and every Jew, ad infinitum, a
congenital, ingrained or adopted dishonesty
where his church's property and own property
are involved. The leveling of such a charge
is as unorthodox and ungracious as the charge
itself. We cannot accept defendant's premise
on any legal, social, economic or religious
grounds.
Kay, 475 P.2d at 542. A concurring opinion stated:

-15-

The defendant's lawyer asserts that he can
represent the client fairly because he has
taken an oath as a lawyer to do so. It seems
that he refuses to ascribe to the jurors this
same degree of moral integrity which he arrogates unto himself. Honesty should compel
him to believe that each juror would be mindful of his own oath to render a just and true
verdict according to the law and the evidence.
Kay, 475 P.2d at 543.
The Ball and Kay rulings did not require any juror to
disclose his religious preferences.

Many religions counsel their

members against the use of alcohol:

Mormons, Seventh Day Adven-

tists, certain Methodist and Baptist denominations.

The simple

question whether a view about alcohol arose from religious teaching was sufficient; the juror's religious affiliation would not
be disclosed but the defendant would have the basis for arguing
that the juror should be excused for cause because his religious
views would influence his decision.

A religious view which might

constitute a prejudice against a particular class of defendants
(in Ball, those accused of drunken driving) could properly be
made but could also be made without religious disclosure.
In Kay, this Court firmly guarded against the sweeping
indictment of all members of any religion who would be accused
because of their membership in a religion which had allegedly
suffered an injury.

Here, when the case is simple negligence,

the trial court should not be required to obtain disclosures of
religious affiliation upon the plaintiff's sweeping theory that
all members of that religion would be biased against the plain-

-16-

tiff's claim.

The Court of Appeals is mandating that which was

prohibited in Kay.
Petitioners, submit that the Court of Appeals has overstepped the boundaries implied in Ball and Kay, and that its
ruling must thus be reversed.
IV.

POTENTIAL JURORS HAVE A RIGHT TO THE PRIVACY OF THEIR VIEWS
AND BELIEFS.
Every citizen, whether or not called to be a member of

a jury panel, has the rights of conscience and religious belief.
These are private rights to each individual, guaranteed by constitution and by case law.
Becoming a member of a jury panel fulfills both an
obligation and a privilege of citizenship.

The potential juror

is asked to lay aside regular activities to hear evidence and
offer a verdict as a peer.

These sacrifices are the only ones

which are asked of a juror:

that regular activities be laid

aside.

A call to jury duty does not require a sacrifice of the

juror's rights to freedom of conscience and belief.

To the con-

trary, the potential juror retains those rights but is asked,
under oath, to tell whether he or she is under any prejudice,
bias or other persuasion which would interfere with a fair verdict.

That is enough.

Nothing more intrusive should be sanc-

tioned.
The jury panel member's right to the privacy and integrity of belief cannot so easily be laid aside as the Court of
Appeals would have it.

While the individual litigant is entitled
-17-

to fairness, the juror should not have his privacy intruded upon
by being required to state his religious affiliation or preference.

The Court of Appeals has offered no consideration of the

impact of its decision upon a particular juror or a panel of
jurors.

It has offered no insight into striking a balance be-

tween the individual rights of conscience and religious belief as
against the right of a litigant to challenge for something other
than cause when religious affiliation is not cause to excuse a
juror in a negligence case like this.
These delicate considerations of individual rights and
conscience should be assessed by this Court upon full briefing
and argument.
V.

RULES GOVERNING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES SHOULD NOT SUPERSEDE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES.
Peremptory challenges are governed by rule.

Rule 47,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Although both sets of rules purport to overrule any

statute contrary to their provisions, Petitioners submit that
there is a serious question whether these rules can or were intended to overrule a statutory provision prohibiting discrimination against a juror.

Clearly, such rules cannot supersede con-

stitutional prohibitions.
The exact relationship of the peremptory challenge and
the extent to which a panel of jurors should be questioned is a
complex question which should be carefully briefed and argued
before this Court.

The very stating of the dimensions of the
-18-

problem should lead the Court to consider the issues inherent in
the Court of Appeals' decision.
The ruling by the Court of Appeals, which would permit
inquiry into a juror's specific religion for the sole purpose of
facilitating the use of a peremptory challenge (when religious
views were not sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause),
would permit the peremptory challenge to supersede federal and
state constitutional principles.

The implications of the Court

of Appeals' holding thus justify review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of this first-impression case
involving jury selection in Utah, the Petitioners CPB and Giblett
respectfully request that this Court grant certiorari to review
the Court of Appeals decision so that the issues may be fully
briefed and argued before an intrusive decision is imposed upon
trial proceedings.

The Petitioners seek such other and further

relief as may be just and proper.
Dated:

August 25, 1988
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

%>( T\i<dU^

By / '/(
Allen M. S&fran
M. Karlynn Hinman
Attorneys for Petitioner
Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints
and Charles Giblett
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Judgment on Verdict, Memorandum
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217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627, 72 A.L.R.2d 893 (1958)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

James Hornsby,
Plaintiff and Appellant/

OPINION
(For Publication)

Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints,
a Utah corporation sole#
Charles Giblett/ John Sutton# and
John Does I through X# inclusive/

Case No. 880031-CA

v.

FILED

Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Bench, Billings and Jackson.

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court o< Appeals

BENCH/ Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of no cause of action
entered on a special jury verdict. Because the trial court
improperly limited voir dire of the jury panel/ we vacate the
judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
On March 30/ 1983/ defendants Charles Giblett/ a farmer
for defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (L.D.S Church)/ and John
Sutton were attempting to load into a horse trailer two cows
owned by the L.D.S. Church. Approximately one month earlier#
the two cows had crossed the fences separat ing Sutton's
property and the L.D.S. Church's welfare fa rm located
immediately northwest of Sutton's property, Sutton and Giblett
had agreed to delay retrieving the cows to avoid disturbing
Sutton's cattle.

On March 30, Sutton opened his corral gate and backed his
trailer into the opening. He and Giblett then attached the
gate to the trailer with baling wire and a hook. As the two
men attempted to herd the cows into the trailer, one cow
entered the trailer, but the other cow threw its weight against
the gate, dislodging it from the trailer. The cow exited the
corral and entered a large field owned by Kennecott
Corporation. For the next hour, Sutton and Giblett, assisted
by Sutton0s daughter Mary and two boys, attempted to direct the
errant cow back onto Sutton's property. Sutton and Mary drove
in separate vehicles with emergency lights flashing, trying to
locate the cow. Mary parked and exited her car in a further
attempt to locate the cow. When she spotted the cow, she
returned to her car.
At that moment, plaintiff James Hornsby, an employee of
Kennecott, was driving home on his motorcycle. He noticed Mary
waving her arms at him, but considered her waving to be a
greeting, not a warning. Approximately 200 feet past Mary and
her car, the cow darted out onto the road. Unable to avoid the
cow, Hornsby laid his motorcycle down on the road and suffered
serious injuries.
Hornsby filed this action for damages, alleging negligence
on the part of defendants. In response to special
interrogatories, the jury found no negligence on the part of
any of the defendants but determined plaintiff was negligent
and his negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries.
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of
defendants.
On appeal, Hornsby alleges the trial court erred in
refusing to voir dire members of the jury panel concerning
their affiliation with the L.D.S. Church. At the time of voir
dire, Hornsby proposed the following questions, among others,
to the trial court:
Are any of you members of the L.D.S.
Church?
Would that, in any way, affect your
ability to evaluate the evidence in this
case and render a fair decision for the
plaintiff?
Did any of you hold a position in the
L.D.S. Church such as Bishop or presiding
officer or counselor?
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Which stake
was that in?
located?1

Where is that

Would that position affect you in making a
fair decision in this case?
If the evidence were favorable to the
plaintiff in this case, would you have a
problem in awarding a judgment against the
L.D.S. Church?
The trial court rejected Hornsbyfs proposed questions, later
explaining "it's none of this Court's business, or anybody's
business what [jurors'] religious preferences are." The court
then asked:
Are there any of you who feel that you
would have trouble being an impartial
juror because of feelings you may have
either pro or con with regard to the
L.D.S. Church that you think might affect
your ability to be a fair and impartial
juror in this case? If so, I'd like you
to raise your hand.
The court stated for the record that all members of the panel
had indicated religious feelings would have no effect on their
decision.
Hornsby argues the trial court erred in limiting voir d^Lre
regafgihg the juryHganel's reiigidixs affiliations."" The L^D.S
CKurch contends where religious doctrine or practices are not
at issue, it is not proper for a court to inquire as to a
juror's religious affiliation. The scope of voir dire is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial j?_ourt# and its
rulings with respect thereto "wIllTIotHbe^l^^
oh appeal
absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion. MaItby v. Cox
Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 444
U.S. 945 (1979). The trial court abuses its discretion when,
"considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not]
1. A stake is a geographical unit in the L.D.S. Church. In
his appellate brief, Hornsby also claims he should have been
allowed to ask whether any juror attended the Oquirrh Stake
from where the cow came, whether any of them held positions in
that stake, and whether any of them ever volunteered at the
subject farm or knew anyone who had or did.
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afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate jurors.- State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,
448 (Utah 1988).
Voir dire haa_as^,one of^JLts purposes jfche de±Bction fiJLJbias
suflici^CLLto challenge a rujoss^c^i^^^xixai^tox^cause
. State
v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). Un3er Utah R7 Civ. P.
47(f), a prospective juror may be challenged for cause on any
of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications
prescribed by law to render a person
competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree to either party, or to an
officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and
creditor, guardian and ward, master and
servant, employer and employee or
principal and agent, to either party, or
united in business with either party, or
being on any bond or obligation for either
party; provided, that the relationship of
debtor and creditor shall be deemed not to
exist between a municipality and a
resident thereof indebted to such
municipality by reason of a tax, license
fee, or service charge for water power,
light or other services rendered to such
resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having
been a witness, on a previous trial
between the same parties for the same
cause of action, or being then a witness
therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the
juror in the result of the action, or in
the main question involved in the action,
except his interest as a member or citizen
of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging; but no
person shall be disqualified as a juror by
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reason of having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon
public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notoriety# if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that
the juror can and will, notwithstanding
such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
We believe the question asked by the trial__court wassuf f icient
tp"~detect _^ny_ag£uial subjectivebias ]£^^ar£ant a
cK^ieii^Bz^pP
qause under subsection (6). Because it is not necessary to
this appeal, we do not decide whether the voir dire was
sufficient to reveal circumstances or relationsjiips that would
warrant^cgartlenges for cause under other subsections of RuTe "~
47(f).
—
A second proper purpose for voir dire is "the collection of
^at-a €n pAfrTOit^Tnformed exercise of the pe^emR!^?yiJ:haLl^nge.H
Taylor. 664 P.2d at 447. Regarding peremptory challenges, the
United States Supreme Court has held:
The essential nature of the peremptory
challenge is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's
control. While challenges for cause
permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable
basis of partiality, the peremptory
permits rejection for a real or imagined
partiality that is less easily designated
or demonstrable.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citations
omitted). A prospective juror's group affiliations is a common
and proper topic for voir dire and ground for a peremptory
challenge. As the Swain Court continued:
[A peremptory challenge] is often
exercised . . . upon a juror's "habits and
associations" . . . .
It is no less
frequently exercised on grounds normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or
official action, namely, the race,
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religion, nationality, occupation or
affiliations of people summoned for jury
duty,
I&. (quoting Haves v. Missouri. 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887))
(emphasis added).
The issue of religion as a topic for voir dire was
addressed in State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984). In
Ball, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol. During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury
panel whether any of them had prejudices against people that
drink. None indicated they did. Defendant then asked if any
of them chose not to drink for any reason. Four jurors
responded they did not drink. Defendant then proposed to the
trial court to ask if those jurors' choice not to drink was for
a personal or a religious conviction. The trial court,
concerned with constitutional protections, denied defendant's
request. Defendant was able to eliminate three of the four
non-drinking jurors by exercising all of his peremptory
challenges, but the fourth sat on the jury which convicted
him.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held defendant's question
as to the four jurors' reasons for their non-use of alcohol
should have been allowed. The Court acknowledged the "extreme
deference afforded in Swain to the unfettered exercise of
[peremptory] challenges,H and stated as follows:
Religious beliefs, unlike gender or race,
are not readily apparent, and their
existence, if directly related to the
subject matter of the suit . . . must be
determined by preliminary inquiry. . . .
Voir dire is intended to provide a tool
for counsel and the court to carefully and
skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether
biases and prejudices, latent as well as
acknowledged, will interfere with a fair
trial if a particular juror serves in it.
^ p ^

Id. at 1057, 1058.

Both Swain and B a l l r e c o g n i z e t j ^ r e a r e c a s e s where
r e l i g i o n and group a f f i l i a t i o n ^ ^ j & g ^ ^ p r o p r i a t e t o p i c s for v o i r
d i r e . In t h e i n s t a n t casei^aeFend¥n$: d i d not propose t o
q u e s t i o n t h e p r o s p e c t i v e jurOTS^^nTto t h e i r s p e c i f i c
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beliefs.2 JRa%hor^<^s the L.D.S> Church was one of th^e
parties /(^efendant^merelv proposed to question J:he _jurors
^egarding^ttrgg^ffilij^oj^jwitirthe L.p.S. Church. Whenever a
y^i^i^ut' orgfaniz^ion is a party to the litigation, voir dire'
regarding the jury panelfs religious affiliations is proper.
State vT"Via. i4b^Sxrz7^ToF, 704 P.2d 238~7l985); Coleman v.
United States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977); Casev v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore. 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627
(1958).
Substantial impairment of the right to informed exercise of
peremptory challenges_is_reversibXe, error. Swain, 380 U.S. at
119: Ball" 685 P72d at 10667 In the instant case, the trial
court abused its discretion in denying voir dire^regarding Jbhe
prospective jurors^Mjy.liation with the LJ.DJJL^ Church. The
scope of voir^grrre^shouTd be sufficiently broad to allow the
pai^tTi^^
to exercise their peremptory challenges.
Irr¥o^holding# W<ET do not require the trial^co'urtT tcT propound
tfte precise guejtjLons proposed by Hornsby^ Rather, we leave
intactthe consTderable discretion afforded^to trial^ourtsCto
contain voir ITire^wTEhin fegisonaBT^Timits. See Ball, 685 P.2d
at 1060 (trial court has a duty to protect juror privacy);
People v. Williams. 29 Cal.3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr.
317 (1981) (trial court should not permit inordinately
extensive and unfocused questioning). The judgment in favor of
defendants is vacated and the case is remanded for a new
trial.3
In light of our decision to remand for a new trial, it is
not necessary to discuss Hornsby's other alleged errors.
However, since the trial court may be faced with the same
issues on remand, we make the following observations. See
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986).
2. The religious beliefs of the prospective jurors are not
directly related to the subject matter of this suit, and hence
could not properly be examined during voir dire.
3. Defendants John and Mary Sutton argue any potential
prejudice in favor of the L.D.S. Church caused by the trial
court's error did not affect the jury's finding as to their
lack of negligence. However, in view of the overlapping nature
of the possible liabilities, justice requires a new trial as to
all defendants. See Kord's Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. White. 14
Ariz. App. 294, 482 P.2d 903 (1971).
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Hornsby argues defendants' use of the term "welfare" when
referring to the farm owned by the L.D.S. Church improperly
biased the jury in their favor and was in violation of a court
order. We fail to find any merit in Hornsby's contention. The
subject property is commonly referred to as a welfare farm.
Hornsby offers no evidence of improper bias other than mere
speculation. Furthermore/ Hornsby fails to cite to any record
evidence of a court order regarding the use of the term
"welfare."
Hornsby also argues the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur/ negligence per se, and
strict liability. "A party is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theories of the case and points of law
provided competent evidence is presented to support them."
Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433/ 435 (Utah App. 1987). We
will reverse a trial court's judgment for failure to give a
requested instruction only if the jury is prejudicially misled
or insufficiently or erroneously advised on the law. Jjl.
To warrant a res ipsa loquitur instruction, a plaintiff
must show: 1) the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen but for someone's negligence; 2) plaintiff's own use or
operation of the agency or instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the injury; and 3) the agency or
instrumentality causing the injury was within defendant's
exclusive control and management. Rovlance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d
232/ 235 (Utah App. 1987). Hornsby claims the evidence in the
instant case establishes the three required elements for a res
ipsa loquitur instruction. However/ application of res ipsa
loquitur presupposes a plaintiff's inability to point to the
specific allegedly negligent act which caused the injury. Kusv
v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984). If
the "evidence in the case reveals all of the facts and
circumstances of the occurrence and clearly establishes the
precise allegedly negligent act which is the cause of
plaintiff's injury," then res ipsa loquitur is not applicable.
Roylance, 737 P.2d at 235.
In the instant case, the evidence presented at trial
described and established the act committed by Giblett and
Sutton which Hornsby alleges to be negligent. Defendants
backed the horse trailer into the corral gate opening. They
then attached the rear doors of the trailer to the gate with
baling wire. As they attempted to load the cows into the
trailer, one of the cows threw its weight against the gate#
dislodging it from the trailer. The cow escaped through the

880031-CA

8

opening. As the allegedly negligent act was clear from the
evidence, res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.
The trial court also refused Hornsby's requested
instruction on negligence per se. Violation of a statute or
ordinance is negligence per se. Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80
(Utah App. 1987). Hornsby argues defendants violated Salt Lake
County Ordinances § 10-10-3 (1966) (now § 14.20.050 (1986)),
which states:
Every person staking, tethering, herding,
grazing or pasturing, or allowing to run
at large or causing to be staked,
tethered, herded, grazed or pastured, or
allowed to run at large, any horse, cow,
mule, sheep, goat or swine, or other
animal upon any of the public highways of
the county shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Defendants1 conduct was not in violation of section 10-10-3.
They were not staking, tethering, herding, grazing, or
pasturing the errant cow under the common definitions of those
terms. Nor did defendants "allow" the cow to run at large.
See Santanello v. Cooper. 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970)
(••allow" means to sanction, permit, acknowledge, approve of).
In any event, section 10-10-3 must be construed in light of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38(3) (1987), which states:
In any civil action brought by the owner,
operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle
. . . for damages caused by collision with
any domestic animal or animals on a
highway, there is no presumption that the
collision was due to negligence on behalf
of the owner or the person in possession
of livestock.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1987) provides:
The provisions of this chapter are
applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all of its political
subdivisions and municipalities. A local
authority may not enact or enforce any
rule or ordinance in conflict with the
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provisions of this chapter. Local
authorities may, however, adopt ordinances
consistent with this chapter, and
additional traffic ordinances which are
not in conflict with this chapter.
The trial court's refusal of Hornsby's requested negligence per
se instruction was correct.
Finally, Hornsby contends the court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on strict liability. Hornsby claims the cow
had a dangerous or vicious tendency known to defendants.
Nothing in the record supports his assertion. The court's
refusal to give the instruction was therefore justified.

fZuUL M i ^ ^ C
Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Norman H. Jackson,
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NOV 1 L i ? 3 ;
Allen M. Swan, A3165
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES N. HORNSBY,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

vs •
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES
GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON AND MARY
LEE SUTTON, and DOES I through
X, Inclusive,

Civil No. *€-9-5^5Trr3Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

C $ 3 - S&I9

Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge, commencing
Tuesday the 29th day of October, 1985 and continuing through
Friday the 1st day of November, 1985, Laura L. Boyer appearing
for plaintiff, Allen M, Swan of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
appearing for defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Charles
Giblett and Stephen G, Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading
appearing for defendants John Sutton and Mary Lee Sutton
and testimony having been adduced and argument of counsel

heard and the matter having been submitted to the jury on
a Special Verdict and the jury having returned its Special
Verdict finding that the plaintiff, James Hornsby, was negligent
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident
and finding that none of the defendants were negligent, now
therefore it is hereby
ORDERED that judgment enter on the verdict in favor
of each of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause
of action together with defendants1 costs incurred herein
in the sum of $

yv Stf De-TfKMtdeo t//>o^ /*/(.///£ o^ /^

DATED this

m^71s*0/<-*1^J

/r

<J C

&A? C<0£-7£

ASS**/*/*?*?
— 7>p4

day of November, 1385
BY THE COlliRT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON BtNDLSY
oy

**~~

'

nfioutvClefk

/

w

\

/District

J

Served by mailing copies this 4r iH^ day of November,
1985, to Laura L. Boyer, 3167 West 4700 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84118 and to Stephen G. Morgan, 261 East 300 South,
2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

/^V&>L yy\yAuy»~
A l l e n M. Swan

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES HORNSBY and
NANETTE MAILY HORNSBY, his wife,

#

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-83-5019

vs •
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
:
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS,
a Utah corporation, sole, et al.,#
Defendants •

:

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the part of the
defendants asking the Court to dismiss the claims for loss of
consortium, together with the defendant Church and Giblett's Motion
in Limine seeking to restrict evidence regarding an earlier
alleged negligent act came before the Court for hearing, together
with all parties Motion to Continue the Trial Date, and plaintiffs1
Motion to Amend.

The Court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their

Complaint to set forth additional claims of negligence, and to join
an additional party defendant*

The Court after discussion with

counsel also agreed to strike the trial date currently scheduled
for August 28, 1984, and continue this matter without trial date
until such time as one of the parties at their option files a
supplemental Certification of Readiness for Trial.

The Court

granted the defendants' Motion regarding the plaintiffs* claims for
loss of consortium, and took the question of defendants1 Motion in
Limine under advisement for further consideration.
Upon reviewing the file and considering carefully the issues
of proximate cause, independent intervening proximate cause, and
foreseeablility, the Court declines at this point in time to
grant the defendants' Motion in Limine restricting evidence that may
pertain to alleged negligent conduct on the part of the defendant
Church regarding its fences approximately a month prior to the date
the animal in question escaped.

The Court is unable to rule as a

matter of law at the present time regarding the question of proximate
cause and foreseeability, keeping in mind that such issues are
normally reserved for a jury in cases of negligence such as the one
before the Court,
Counsel for the plaintiffs is to prepare an Order setting forth
the Court's decision as contained in this Memorandum Decision
dealing with plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend, the continuance of the
trial date, and the defendants' Motion in Limine-

Counsel for the

defendant Church is requested to prepare anydrder setting forth the
Court's ruling dismissing the plaintiffs/ claim for loss of consortium.
Dated this

+

/p

day of July, 1/84 A

TlMtfTHY^R. HANSON
D I S T R I C T COURT JUDGE

ATTEST

H

^

je^—i

DiXON HlNDttV
•—Dsputyci«*
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CASEY v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BALTIMORE

Md. 627

Cite as 143 A.2d 627

In the case before us the landowner lived
in the property before the tax sale and has
continuously remained in possession for
over seven years since the tax sale. I
think that Sec. 17 of Art. 57 was not repealed by the tax sales law of 1943 and
that it entitled the landowner to the relief
he sought in his bill to quiet title. As I
read the section, it applies only to those
who seek to enter and not to those already
in possession. There would seem to be no
necessity, under the statute, to apply the
period of limitations to one already in possession, who seeks no more than a declaration of his right to remain in possession.
The decision of the majority was that the
court lacked jurisdiction in the proceedings to foreclose the right of redemption
because the description of the property
used in the tax sale and in the foreclosure
proceedings was inadequate and irregular.
The heart of the majority opinion is found
in the sentence: "No policy in favor of
protecting tax titles acquired through proceedings in rein can make a description
which describes land as situated in one part
of a county adequate to describe land situated in another." The property was described as owned by Henry Granville
Thomas, Jr., and as consisting of " 9 ^ ac
& Imps, Sweepstakes", located in the 4th
Election District of Montgomery County.
The property is actually situated in the
10th Election District. The mistake in the
election district sounds more serious when
described arithmetically than it actually is,
geographically, since the 4th and 10th Election Districts of Montgomery County are
contiguous, and the land is in the same part
of the county as the description indicates
it to be. A description in a tax sale has two
purposes—to warn the owner and to attract
buyers. Josenhans, Inc., v. Jenkins, 203
Md. 465, 472, 102 A.2d 257, 43 A.L.R.2d
961. The description we are concerned
with might have been inadequate to notify
prospective purchasers of the location of
the property and, so, insufficient to support
a tax sale that was duly attacked prior to
the decree foreclosing the right of redemp-

tion. However, if the owner had read the
description either in the advertisement of
the tax sale or in the notice by publication
in the foreclosure proceedings, he would
instantly have known that his property was
being referred to. This fact makes it plain
that the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County had jurisdiction. Although the
proceeding is in rem and he need not have
been, the landowner was a resident, the
land is in the county, and the advertisement could not have failed to warn the
landowner H. Granville Thomas that his
9}i acres in Montgomery County, known
as Sweepstakes, was being dealt with. In
determining the validity of the proceedings to foreclose only the effect of the description on the owner need be considered.
The Tax Sales Act of 1943 sought to
make tax sales immune from attacks not
asserted in the proceedings to foreclose
the right of redemption other than lack of
jurisdiction or fraud in that proceeding.
Since the passage of the Act, this Court has
faithfully protected its purpose. As a result, the intent of the Act to make tax sales
titles valid and marketable has been effectuated. The majority opinion cannot fail
seriously to weaken, if not to destroy, the
legislative purpose and the prior holdings
of this Court in carrying out that purpose
in Thomas v. Kolker, 195 Md. 470, 73 A.2d
886; Oppenheimer v. Micbar Co., 192 Md.
192, 63 A.2d 765; Shapiro v. National Color
Printing Co., 191 Md. 194, 60 A.2d 679;
Gathwright v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 181 Md. 362, 30 A.2d 252, 145
A.L.R. 590; James v. Zantzinger, 202 Md.
109, 96 A.2d 10, and Sanchez v. James, 209
Md. 266, 120 A.2d 836. Never before have
prior irregularities been allowed to effect
a foreclosure decree or to serve as the
basis of a finding of lack of jurisdiction.
Now I fear, tax titles have again been
made doubtful and litigation as to them invited by unnecessarily—and I think erroneously—basing the decision on a very unsettling ground when the same result properly could have been reached on another
ground.

217 Md. 595
Harriet M. CASEY
v.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
BALTIMORE.
No. 299.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
July 19, 1958.
Dissenting Opinion July 28, 1958.
Action by parishioner against a religious corporation for personal injuries sustained on a waxed floor. Judgment for
plaintiff for $2,500 and plaintiff appealed
from the judgment in the Superior Court
of Baltimore County, Emory H. Niles,
Chief Judge, on the ground that the award
was inadequate and the corporation filed
a cross appeal. The Court of Appeals, Horney, J., held that evidence of negligence and
contributory negligence was for the jury,
that the voir dire examination of prospective jurors was inadequate, that part of a
pretrial statement was improperly deleted,
and that instructions on damages were sufficient.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded
for a new trial.
Hammond, J., dissented.

low such questions is an abuse of discretion constituting reversible error.
4. Jury «©=>131(6)

In action against a Roman Catholic
Archbishop, a corporation, for injuries sustained by a parishioner, question asked
prospective jurors which was in the form
so general that it did not sufficiently indicate to the panel what possible bias or prejudice was being probed, was insufficient
and the court should have informed the
prospective jurors that the suit was against
the Roman Catholic Archbishop, the corporation, that the suit was against the corporation only, that it was not a suit against
the Archbishop personally.
5. Jury <S=3l3l(6)

In action against a religious corporation, if the religious affiliation of a prospective juror might reasonably prevent him
from arriving at an impartial verdict, the
parties were entitled to ferret out, or have
the court discover for them, the existence
of bias or prejudice resulting from such
affiliation.
6. Jury <§=>97(l)

A party is entitled to a jury free of
all disqualifying bias or prejudice and not
merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of
a general or abstract nature.

1. Religious Societies <§=>3l(6)

7. Trial <S=>9(I)

In action for injuries sustained by
parishioner who slipped and fell on waxed
floor of a church building, evidence of negligence and contributory negligence was
properly submitted to the jury.

On issue of whether it is proper to delete a reference in a pretrial statement to
insurance, the deletion is usually preferred
in order to avoid the possible prejudicial
effect, that reference to insurance might
have on a jury if the word was not deleted.

2. Jury <S=3l3l(2)

The scope of questions propounded to
jurors on their voir dire is largely in the
discretion of the trial court.
3. Appeal and Error <^I045(I)
Jury <®=5l3l(l)

Parties to an action triable before a
jury have a right to have questions propounded to prospective jurors on their voir
dire which are directed to a specific cause
for disqualification and the failure to al-

8. Trial <§=>I27

When the reference to insurance is
made by the defendant, he cannot move for
a mistrial.
9. Trial <§=M27
In action by a parishioner against a
religious corporation for injuries where
witness had made a signed statement stating that the parishioner "said she hoped the
insurance on the Church was paid up" and
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the priest made a remark about not worrying about it, where defendant sought to
introduce the statement without reference
to the quoted phrase to impeach the witness,
and the deletion materially changed the
meaning of what the witness had said in
the statement as to relevant facts, defendant
was required to choose between introducing
the whole statement without alteration or
none of it, and where the deletion would
produce a substantial alteration of the
meaning of the phrase in which the reference to insurance was used, the exclusion
should not have been permitted.
10. Appeal and Error <S=»215<I)
Where appellant failed to object to an
amended instruction, the Court of Appeals
was without jurisdiction to consider her
contentions with respect thereto. Maryland
Rules, rule 554 and subd. d.
11. Trial ©=5228(1)

The Court of Appeals cannot put the
trial judge in a strait jacket and prescribe
or adopt a formula to be used and followed
by him with respect to his instructions to
the jury.
12. Trial <§=232(l)
Instructions are sufficient if the question or point of law involved is fully and
comprehensively covered.
13. Damages <S=2fO(l)
In action for personal injuries, original and amended instructions contained a
fair statement of the law with respect to
damages with respect to plaintiff's contention that they omitted any mention of her
inability to do her household duties and
that she was denied any recovery for her
crippled condition.

Paul Berman and Melvin J. Sykes, Baltimore (Sigmund Levin and Theodore B.
Berman, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
J. Gilbert Prendergast and George E.

dergast, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

no artificial lighting in the main body of
the church at the time of the accident.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and H E N D E R SON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and
HORNEY, JJ.

The plaintiff, an elderly maiden lady and
a member of St. Patrick's Parish, arrived
at the church at about 5 o'clock, entered
the main door, which was at the far end of
the church from the altar, walked down
the center aisle to the second pew from the
main door, and prayed prior to making her
confession. Her ante-confession prayers
-completed, she turned toward the main door,
^proceeded to the confessional booth immediately to the right of the center aisle
from the main entrance, and remained there
until about ten after five. Then, as was her
custom, and in fact the usual custom for
all parishioners, she walked up the center
aisle toward the altar to complete her prayers. She did not notice that the floor was
slippery until she slipped and fell at a point
slightly over halfway to the altar rail.
When her feet slipped from under her, she
fell backwards. She tried to break the fall
with her hands and in so doing broke bones
in both wrists, and the back of her head
struck the tile floor. A sergeant in the Air
Force interrupted his prayers to aid the
plaintiff, and when he approached the place
where she was lying, he too slipped but
•managed to check a fall. He then observed
-a translucent fluid in the middle of the aisle
which appeared to be wax. There was
other testimony that there were wet spots
which were "dangerously slippery" due to
the wax on the floor. Another parishioner
had also slipped a few minutes before the
plaintiff but she did not fall. Although the
evidence was conflicting, there was also
testimony that there were no barriers across
the center aisle to give warning of the possibly dangerous condition. No verbal warning of the slippery condition was given to
the plaintiff, although at least one other
parishioner was so warned.

HORNEY, Judge.
Harriet M. Casey, plaintiff-appellant and
cross-appellee (the plaintiff), brought suit
in the Superior Court of Baltimore City
against Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, a corporation sole of the State of
Maryland (corporation sole or defendant),
as the holder of the legal title to St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church of Havre de
Grace, for damages arising out of personal injuries she sustained when she slipped
and fell on the waxed floor of the church
building. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for $2,500, but, claiming that the award was inadequate, she appealed alleging errors in the examination of
the jurors on their voir dire, in a ruling
on the evidence, and in the instructions of
the court with respect to damages. The
right of the plaintiff to appeal from a judgment in her favor is not disputed. The
corporation sole filed a cross-appeal on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence
of negligence for the case to go to the jury.
In the afternoon of Saturday, October
2, 1954, before the plaintiff arrived, two
workmen or sextons had cleaned and waxed
the floors inside the church. At least threefourths of the center aisle had been waxed
with a liquid spread by an ordinary domestic rag mop made of twisted strings. No
buffer was used because it was too late in
the afternoon and the sextons thought it
would be "better to leave the wax on and
let the people work it out themselves," that
is, by walking on it. Although there was
no unanimity as to the condition of the
weather, it appears that it was not conducive to quick drying. The church was not
well lighted, and one witness testified that
the center aisle was the darkest part of the
church. The church had stained glass win-

Father Monmonier, the parish priest, was
called and, according to the sextons, he
tested the floor by trying to "skate" up the
aisle on the waxed surface to ascertain how
slippery the floor was. He "skated" from
_ 1

xi

i_:_i.:.cr

i..:

1 „ , „ . . „*«,-*_

ped only by the altar rail. As a result of the
test, he gave orders to the sextons to remove the wax immediately and to mop the
center aisle with clear warm water, which
was promptly done.
After the accident the plaintiff was taken
to the hospital where she remained for
three weeks. For three weeks after her
discharge, a nurse and a maid took care of
her. But the effects of her injuries persisted. It was estimated that she had a
permanent disability of between thirty-five
and fifty per centum, and a loss of functioning in both hands and both arms.
We shall consider the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence as to negligence
first, and then the errors alleged by the
plaintiff.
(i). Negligence.
[1] Since there was legally sufficient
evidence to entitle the plaintiff to recover,
the trial court was correct in submitting the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury. In Isaac Benesch &
Sons v. Ferkler, 1927, 153 Md. 680, 139 A.
557, recovery was permitted against a department store by a customer who testified
that the floor on which she fell was " 'dark
and mucky and smeary, like an oiled floor
would be when the oil was not dried,' "
and that the oily condition of the floor was
"what caused her to fall." We upheld the
propriety of submitting the case to the jury
by saying, 153 Md. at page 684, 139 A. at
page 559:
"These were facts from which the
jury might conclude that the appellant
[defendant] had been negligent. It
was not the mere fact that the floor
was oiled and the appellee [plaintiff]
fell that entitled her to recover; it was
the condition in which the floor was
left as a result of the oiling that was
submitted to the jury, * * *."
In the case now before us there was
amplr evidence of the condition in which
the 1 . had been left. The wax had been
poured on and spread only with a rag mop,
and had not been buffed. No effort had
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with a uniform smoothness. That task was
left to "the people" by walking on i t As a
result wet spots remained in the middle of
he aisle which were "dangerously slippery."
Dne such spot was within two paces from
where the plaintiff fell. Other persons had
slipped on the floor both before and after
he plaintiff had fallen. Immediately after
he accident the parish priest was able to
.lide or "skate" up the aisle about thirteen
'eet to the alter rail, whereupon he ordered
he wax removed. One of the sextons had
varned another parishioner, but he had not
varned the plaintiff of the slippery condiion. Under these circumstances, it canlot be said that there was no evidence of
legligence. See Prosser, Torts (2d ed.
955) § 78. Furthermore, whether the
)laintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to be on the lookout for a
vaxed floor or in not observing the slippery
•ondition of the floor was also a question
)f fact for the jury, and not a question of
aw for the trial court to decide in this
ase. Isaac Benesch & Sons v. Ferkler,
upra.
(ii).

"(2) If, in your opinion, the evidence in the case warrants a verdict
for the plaintiff, Miss Casey, against
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, a corporation sole of the State of
Maryland, the defendant, is there any
member of the jury panel who could
not fairly and impartially assess damages in the case in the same manner as
if the defendant were a regular corporation or a natural person?"
The court declined to inform the jury or
to ask the questions as requested. There is
a difference of opinion as to whether the
jurors heard the clerk recite the title of the
case when it was called for trial. In any
event, the trial court, after informing the
jurors that one of the parties was a "religious corporation," propounded the following question:
"Is there any reason, such as religious scruples or any other reason,
which would prevent any one of you
from giving the parties a fair and impartial trial, finding a verdict based
only on the law and the evidence?"

Voir Dire Examination.

Before the trial began the plaintiff revested the court to inform the jury that
he defendant was a corporation sole and
is such was the "owner and * * * in
>ossession and control" of the church
luilding, and to propound the following
[uestions to the panel of jurors on their
'oir dire:

None of the panel indicated that he had any
bias or prejudice, when interrogated on his
voir dire. It is possible, of course, that the
jurors may have heard the titling of the
case when they were sworn to try the issues, but there is nothing to indicate whether they did or not. However, the record
does not disclose that any juror informed
the court at that time of his disqualification.

"(1) Does any member of the jury
panel have any preconceived objections
to, or any preconceived opinions in
favor of, or any bias or prejudice in
favor of or against, a suit in which
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, a corporation sole of the State
of Maryland, is sought to be held liable
in damages for injuries claimed to
have resulted to a person, a member of
the Parish of the Roman Catholic
Church in which such person claims to
have been injured, that would prevent
you from fairly and impartially deciding such a case?"

The rule with respect to the bias or prejudice of a juror in certain cases is sta* ! in
31 Am.Jur., Jury, § 183, in this manner:
"A general, abstract bias or prejudice which a juror may entertain to a
class of litigation will not of itself disqualify him from trying a cause, when
it appears that he can set that feeling
aside and can and will fairly and impartially decide the particular case
solely upon the evidence and the instructions of the court; however,
where such bias or prejudice is a fixed
and abiding one * * * he is dis-

qualified as a juror with respect to an
action falling in such class."
[2, 3] In this State it is well settled that
the scope of the questions propounded to
jurors on their voir dire is largely in the
discretion of the trial court. Of course, the
only purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain
the existence of cause for disqualification.
Grossfeld v. Braverman, 1954, 203 Md. 498,
101 A.2d 824. See also Adams v. State,
1952, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556. However,
it is also well settled that parties to an action triable before a jury have a right to
liave questions propounded to prospective
jurors on their voir dire, which are directed
to a specific cause for disqualification, and
failure to allow such questions is an abuse
of discretion constituting reversible error.
Alexander v. R. D. Grier & Sons Co., 1943,
181 Md. 415, 30 A.2d 757; Cohen v. State,
1937, 173 Md. 216, 195 A. 532, 196 A. 819;
Beck v. State, 1926, 151 Md. 615, 135 A.
410; Whittemore v. State, 1926, 151 Md.
309, 134 A. 322. With respect to the manner in which the trial judge should exercise
his discretion we said in Bryant v. State,
1955, 207 Md. 565, at page 583, 115 AJ2d
502, at page 510:
"In the exercise of * * * discretion, the trial judge should adapt the
questions to the needs of each case in
the effort to secure an impartial jury.
Any circumstances that may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person
unfitted for jury service may be made
the subject of questions and a challenge for cause. Accordingly an examination of a juror on his voir dire is
proper as long as it is conducted within
the right to discover the juror's state
of mind in respect to the matter in
hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him."
[4] The trial court ruled that the questions submitted by the plaintiff would not
be asked because the effect, if not the intent, was to inquire into the jurors' religious affiliations, which the court thought
would be improper. We do not say, or

even intend to intimate, that the court was
required to propound the precise questions
submitted. The form of the questions to be
asked is clearly within the sound discretion
of the court. However, it is clear that the
only question propounded by the court was
not sufficient to determine possible cause
for disqualification by reason of bias or
prejudice or otherwise. The question
asked was in a form so general that it is
likely it did not sufficiently indicate to the
panel of jurors what possible bias or prejudice was being probed. To ask the jurors
whether they would be prevented from rendering a fair and impartial verdict by the
fact that a party was a "religious corporation"—which they might not even realize
meant a church—without informing them
of the church involved or the position of
the religious corporation in the suit would
defeat the whole purpose of questioning
jurors on their voir dire. We think there
is no doubt that the court should have informed the prospective jurors that the action was a suit by Harriet M. Casey
against Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore, a corporation sole, for personal
injuries allegedly arising out of an accident
which occurred in St. Patrick's Church at
Havre de Grace. ^n-October 2, 1954; that
the suit was against the corporation only,
as the holder of the legal title to the church
building; and that it was not a suit against
the Archbishop of Baltimore personally nor
against him in his ecclesiastical capacity as
such Archbishop. Then, the court should
have propounded a question inquiring if
there was any reason why any juror could
not arrive at a fair and impartial verdict
based on the evidence to be produced and
the law applicable to the case to be set forth
in the instructions of the court, or words to
that effect. If the court had deemed it
necessary, it could have continued to examine the jurors, or any one of them, in the
manner suggested in Bryant v. State, supra.
By so doing, the nature of the answer, if it
disclosed cause for disqualification, would
not necessarily have revealed the religious
affiliation of the juror who made answer,
and whether the juror was favorably or un-
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favorably disposed toward the Roman
Catholic Church or toward an adherent to
its religious faith.

added indicates the parts deleted). During
the course of the trial, the defendant, desiring to use the statement to impeach the
credibility of the witness, applied to the
[5, 6] Beyond this, however, even if the
court for permission, which was granted
trial court was correct in its characterizaover the objection of the plaintiff, to delete
tion of the question it propounded, the law
certain words (above emphasized), particuis clear that, if the religious affiliation of a
larly the reference to the word "insurance,"
juror might reasonably prevent him from
and to insert certain other words. After
at living at a fair and impartial verdict in a
the deletion and insertion had been made
particular case because of the nature of the
the two sentences referred to read: "Mrs.
case, the parties are entitled to ferret out, or
Brown made a remark that the floor was
pieferably have the court discover for
slippery. Father made a remark about not
them, the existence of bias or prejudice reworrying about it." (The emphasis added
sulting from such affiliation.
In other
indicates the part inserted). The witness,
words, a party is entitled to a jury free of
when testifying on direct examination, had
all disqualifying bias or prejudice without
made no mention of insurance. It might be
exception, and not merely a jury free of
argued that the deletion favored the plainbias or prejudice of a general or abstract
tiff in that the altered statement indicated
nature. Cf. Adams v. State, supra. And
jee Miles v. United States, 1881, 103 U.S. that the priest had indirectly admitted lia504, 26 L.Ed. 481 [jurors asked if they be- bility, and that she need not worry about
ieved in the truth of Mormon teachings] ; compensation for her injuries. However,,
the plaintiff, among other assigned reasons,,
^eople v. Reyes, 1855, 5 Cal. 347 [conviction
insists that the alteration of the grammati)f Mexican Roman Catholic reversed becal structure of the first sentence materially
cause trial court refused to inquire if projective jurors were members of the Know changed the meaning of what the witness
had said in a part of the statement which
Nothing Party and had taken a secret obigation under which they could not possibly not only referred to insurance but also, indirectly, to certain relevant facts which
lave given a Roman Catholic a fair and im>artial trial] ; Smith v. Smith, 1935, 7 Cal. were clearly admissible. On the other
hand, the defendant contends that the dele\pp.2d 271, 46 P.2d 232 [jurors asked if
tions were harmless. On the issue of
heir religious belief in regard to divorce
md remarriage might affect the verdict]. whether it is proper to delete a reference to
Jee also Cleage v. Hyden, 1871, 53 Tenn. insurance from a pre-trial statement, writr
3. We hold that the examination of the ten or oral, or a contract, memorandum or
>rospective jurors on their voir dire in this other paper writing * * * , the cases
ase was not sufficiently comprehensive to and law writers tend to favor the deletion
of the word on the giound of irrelevancy
Lssure the selection of a fair and impartial
even though the exclusion might possibly
ury.
distort slightly the meaning of the phrase in
which it was used. A deletion is usually
(Hi)
Deletion of Part of Pre-trial
preferred in order to avoid the possible
Statement.
prejudicial effect the reference to insurance
[7] Prior to the trial of this case, the
might have on a jury if the word was not
ilaintiff's witness, Sergeant Leo M. Moore, deleted. See Jones v. Gilland, 1955, 137
r., had made a signed statement in which
Cal.App.2d 486, 290 P.2d 329; Sapp v. Key,
le had said, among other things: "Mrs. Mo.1956, 287 S.W.2d 775; Anderson v. EnJrown, after noting the floor was slippery, field, 1955, 244 Minn. 474, 70 N.W.2d 409;
aid she hoped the insurance on the church Capozi v. Hearst Publishing Co., 1952, 371
•>as paid up. Father made a remark about Pa. 503, 92 A.2d 177; Derrick v. Rock,
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Tmr v. Tourangeau, 1950, 116 V t 199, 71 A.
2d 565; Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin, 1946, 313 Mich. 528, 21 N.W.2d 841;
Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 1945, 219 Minn.
541, 18 N.W.2d.582; Kuhn v. Kjose, 1933,
216 Iowa 36f 248 N.W. 230; McCoimick,
Evidence (1954) § 56; 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3ded. 1940) § 2113(a). But compare
Rodgers v. Ashley, 3 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d
534; Fleischman v. City of Reading, 1957,
388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429; Vanni v. Cloutier, 1956, 100 N.H. 272, 124 A.2d 204;
Guarnaccia v. Wiecenski, 1943, 130 Conn.
20, 31 A.2d 464; and especially the Maryland cases of Rhinehart v. Lemmon, 1942,
181 Md. 663, 29 A.2d 279, and Takoma Park
Bank v. Abbott, 1941, 179 Md. 249, 19 A.2d
169, which did not, however, involve the
exact point now under consideration.
In the Rhinehart case, supra, even though
a "farm bureau" sign on an automobile seen
at the scene of the accident carried a suggestion of insurance, it was held that:
"[Reference to [the sign] as a
mark distinguishing the car would be
relevant and unobjectionable. A suggestion of the possession of insurance
is not to be avoided at the cost of suppressing evidence material to the establishment of the cause of accident
and liability of the defendant sued for
damages."
[8] This Court has often recognized
that when the reference to insurance is
made by the defendant, he is in no position
to move for a mistrial. International Comn n v v. Clark, 1925, 147 Md. 34, 127 A. 647;
5 Md.L.Rev. 422 (1941). In the TaPark Bank case, supra, an action
«'£.niist a bank by the lessees of a safe deposit box for the loss of the contents of the
box, the Court held that it was proper for
the trial court to admit a statement made by
the vice-president of the bank that the
plaintiff had nothing to worry about since
the bank was protected by insurance. At
page 265 of 179 Md., at page 177 of 19 A.2d,
we said:
"It will be noted that the defendant
itself, in mentioning insurance, first in-

jected it into the case. On no grounds
recognized by reason or justice should
it now be heard to complain because its
statement went before the jury when
in the first instance [defendant] suggested it as an answer to the plaintiff's
loss. * * * [Defendant], therefore,
having injected insurance apparently
as its reason and the only reason for
the relaxation of due diligence in protecting the plaintiff's property is certainly not injured by this ruling."
The Maryland cases previously referred
to are not directly in point since the issue
here is whether the defendant has a right
to delete a reference to insurance before
any mention of insurance is made at the
trial. Those cases involved only situations
where the defendant had already introduced evidence of insurance and then
sought a mistrial. However, it should not
be overlooked that the Takoma Park Bank
case, supra, is also authority to hold that
the remark made by the priest relative to
"not worrying about it" could be construed
as an excuse for relaxation of care and diligence, and therefore relevant to the issues
in the instant case. At page 265 of 179
Md., at page 177 of 19 A.2d we also said:
"It cannot be said that the statement
made by the executive vice-president in
answer to appellee's charges of the
bank's neglect in failing to protect his
property would not to some extent be
relevant as indicating to reasonable
minds an excuse on the bank's part for
a relaxation of care, diligence and responsibility, because undoubtedly it
was relevant to the very issue in the
case."
See also Olson v. Sharpe, 1953, 36 Tenn.
App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867, in which it was
held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the plaintiff to introduce a certificate of indemnity insurance
for the purpose of showing the existence of
a master-servant relationship, which was
one of the issues in the case. The statement in McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 168,
is also pertinent:
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"[E]vidence of the fact of * * *
insurance is inadmissible unless it falls
within some one of a group of exceptional situations. In these situations
presumably the trial judge's discretionary power to exclude could still be invoked if he should consider that the
need for and value of the evidence
were outweighed by its likelihood of
misuse by the jury. What are those
exceptions?
"[T]he admission of a party bearing
on negligence or damages may include
a reference to the fact of insurance
which cannot be severed without substantially lessening the evidential value
of the admission."
[9] In a case such as this—where the
defendant desires to introduce a signed
statement into the evidence, but without
the reference therein to insurance, for the
Purpose of impeaching a witness—and
where the deletion of the phrase in which
Jie reference appears materially changes,
n one way or another, the meaning of what
he witness has said in the statement as to
Facts which are relevant and clearly admissible, as the statement in this case does—
ve hold that the defendant must elect beween an introduction of the whole statenent without alteration or none of it.
Adhere the deletion would produce a subtantial alteration of the meaning of the
>hrase in which the reference to insurance
vas used, the exclusion should not be pernitted.
(iv).

Instructions as to Damages.

[10] Strictly speaking, there was no asignment of error in the instructions with
espect to damages. After the original intruction to the jury had been made, the
laintiff objected to two omissions in the
harge by pointing out to the trial judge
hat he had omitted any mention of the
laintiff's "inability to do her household
uties," and that the court had denied her
any recovery for her crippled condition."
'he judge by his amended charge instructd the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to
"fair and reasonable [sum] for the

* * * loss of use of her hands in personal or household matters, h addition to
the loss of earning power." On appeal the
plaintiff contends that the court did not include in the amended instruction the omissions from the original instruction except in
the alternative. She insists that a proper
instruction would have informed the jury
that she was entitled to compensation for
her crippled condition and disability, not
only with respect to her earning power but
also with respect to her ability to perform
her household duties and other personal
matters. Even if we assume that the plaintiff's contentions are correct, we are without authority to consider the matter for the
simple reason that she failed to object to
the amended instruction pursuant to Maryland Rule 554, subd. d. W e think it is
clear that Rule 554 is as applicable to an
amended instruction as it is to an original
instruction, and that a party must fully
comply with the requirements of the rule
at every stage of the instructions in order
to preserve his rights; otherwise there is
nothing for us to consider on an appeal.
[11-13] However, in this instance, since
the case is to be retried, we think it is desirable, if not necessary, for us to comment
briefly on the instructions of the court with
respect to damages. If the original and
amended instructions are read together as
we read them, we think it is clear that the
charge as a whole contains a fair statement
of the law with respect to damages in a
case such as this. See West v. Belle Isle
Cab Co., 1953, 203 Md. 244, 100 A.2d 17.
The law on the subject was fairly covered
by the instructions in the present case, and
that is all the rule requires. We have repeatedly stressed the fact that we cannot
put the "trial judge in a strait jacket, and
prescribe or adopt a formula to be used and
followed by him," with respect to his instructions to the jury. State, for Use of
Taylor v. Barlly, 1958, 216 Md. 94, 140 A.
2d 173, 176, and cases therein cited. We
have also held that it is sufficient if the
question or point of law involved is "fully
and comprehensively covered" by the judge

in his instructions. Ager v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 1957, 213 Md. 414, 132 A.2d
469, 475.
For the reasons assigned the judgment
must be reversed, and the case remanded
for a new trial.
Judgment reversed and case remanded
for a new trial, the appellee to pay the
costs.
HAMMOND, Judge (dissenting).
I agree with the Court that the trial
judge should have asked the jurors on voir
dire substantially the questions that appellant's counsel requested. I see no need to
reverse, however, for prejudice was not
shown and is not fairly inferable. The jurors sitting on front benches, but a few feet
from the clerk, hardly can fail to have
heard the names of the parties when the
case was called for trial a few minutes before Judge Niles asked the question he did
as to possible prejudice as to a "religious
corporation". Immediately after he asked
it the jurors again heard the names of the
parties, when they were sworn. No juror
could have failed to know that the Roman
Catholic Archbishop was the religious corporation to which possible prejudice was to
be related and no juror felt disqualified.
The Court's decision on the use of the
altered statement of the witness Moore
seems to me wrong and unfortunate. It is
still the rufe in Maryland—whether or not
it is a good or bad rule—that negligence
cases are supposed to be tried and determined as if insurance were not involved—
even negligence cases against charitable
corporations. If the defendant brings out
the fact that he is insured generally he may
not call for a mistrial even though, in the
words of this Court as to juries in International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A.
647, 650, "it seems to be natural and a
weakness of human nature to allow the fact
that the record defendant will not have to
pay the judgment, to influence them in their
verdict * * *."
If the aim is to continue to be to keep
from the jury whether or not the defend-

ant is insured, a defendant who desires to
bring out the truth by use of a statement
that contains a reference to insurance
should be allowed to alter the statement
even to the point of slight distortion of
meaning, and use it.
A fundamental and primary purpose of a
law suit is to reveal the true facts. Because a law suit is an adversary contest is
no reason to put difficulties in the way of
this purpose by hampering a party who
seeks to show facts favorable to him. The
Court has erected such a road block by
finding a distortion of meaning where none
existed and thus requiring a defendant to
elect between not using a paper calculated
to draw out the truth and using it at the
disadvantage of letting the jury know he is
insured.
Father Monmonier's reply to Mrs.
Brown's statement that the floor was slippery and she hoped the church's insurance
was paid up—that she was not to worry
about it,—could have meant any one or
more of a number of things. It could have
been intended, for example, to say politely,
that the matter was none of Mrs. Brown's
business, or to say that which ought to be
done under the circumstances would be
done. As altered the statement said the
floor was slippery and Father said not to
worry about it. The reply to Mrs. Brown's
remark, as changed, meant just as much
or just as little as the reply to her original
remark. Certainly there was no substantial
alteration of meaning, or even the slightest
of distortions.
It may well be that the rule as to the
jury's knowledge of insurance should be
changed. If so, it should be done directly
by the Legislature. The Court should not,
I feel, change it piecemeal by requiring
a defendant to reveal the fact he is insured
or lose the use of a weapon effective in
bringing out the truth.
By straining to find an altered meaning,
where none existed, the Court has begun
the change in the instant case, it seems to
me.
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